A recent Second Department decision, Quintero v. MBH Capital, LLC, provides a useful reminder for construction-site and premises-liability litigation involving a defendant that no longer owned the property at the time of the accident.

The plaintiff allegedly fell and sustained injuries while working at a property in Brooklyn. Federal Brick Management Group, LLC, a former owner, moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had sold the premises before the accident and no longer owned or operated the property.

The Second Department drew an important distinction between the plaintiff's statutory Labor Law claims and the premises-based claims.

As to Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6), the Court reversed the lower court and held that Federal Brick was entitled to dismissal. The Court explained that the narrow exception that may impose liability on a prior owner for a dangerous premises condition does not apply to statutory Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6). Because Federal Brick was not the owner or general contractor at the time of the accident, those statutory claims should have been dismissed.

The result was different for the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims, to the extent they sounded in premises liability. Although Federal Brick submitted proof that it had sold the property before the accident, the Court found that the submission did not address whether the alleged dangerous condition existed at the time of conveyance or whether the new owner knew of the condition or had a reasonable time to discover and remedy it. On that record, Federal Brick failed to establish prima facie entitlement to dismissal of those premises-based claims.

Practical takeaway: former ownership may be a strong defense, but it must be developed on a claim-by-claim basis. For Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6), proof that the defendant was not an owner or general contractor at the time of the accident may support dismissal. For Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims sounding in premises liability, the motion should also address whether the alleged condition existed at conveyance and whether the successor owner had notice or a reasonable opportunity to remedy it.