In San Miguel v. Grimaldi, 2025 NY Slip Op 05780, the Court of Appeals recently issued a decision likely to have a significant impact on tort law throughout the state. The Court reaffirmed its position on recovery for purely emotional harm (i.e., injuries without any underlying physical predicate) and thereby demonstrated restraint that seems lacking in many decisions from New York State courts in recent years. This is not a labor law case; it's medical malpractice. But the implications are likely to be felt in other areas of the law over time. 

The underlying facts are tragic. 

The plaintiff was admitted to the hospital on July 1, 2012, after she did not go into labor by her due date, and her doctor induced labor. On the morning of July 3, the doctor attempted to deliver the baby via vacuum extraction but was unsuccessful. The doctor subsequently performed an emergency C-section and delivered the plaintiff's son alive but in critical condition. He died eight days later, after being transported to the hospital's neonatal intensive care unit and eventually to another hospital, where he was taken off life support. The plaintiff alleged that, as a result of the defendants' failure to timely perform a C-section, the infant suffered injuries during the course of the plaintiff's labor and delivery, which resulted in the infant's death.

The plaintiff sued under five causes of action: (1) medical malpractice on behalf of her son's estate, (2) medical malpractice on her own behalf, (3) lack of informed consent on behalf of her son's estate, (4) lack of informed consent on her own behalf, and (5) loss of her son's services. 

The defendants moved to dismiss the fourth cause of action. The lower court denied that motion, and the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the denial. The AD invited the Court of Appeals to revisit its holding in a 2005 case where it held that in the absence of an independent injury, a mother may not recover damages for emotional harm where medical malpractice causes in utero injury to the fetus, subsequently born alive. (Sheppard-Mobley v King, 4 NY3d 627, 634 [2005]).

The Court of Appeals accepted the invitation to revisit its prior holding in Sheppard-Mobley and reaffirmed it, and consequently, reversed the AD and dismissed the plaintiff's fourth cause of action for recovery of solely emotional harm for the loss of her son. 

The bottom line is that this is an exceedingly rare example of the court exercising judicial restraint and declining an invitation to extend the right to recovery for injured parties. Whether it signifies a larger trend toward more restraint or will be followed by decisions extending the right to recovery for other injuries, such as in Labor Law actions, remains to be seen.